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Introduction
Decision theory, which traces its philosophical foundations to antiquity, has developed into a mathematically mature subject in recent times. Early evidence of mathematical analysis in decision theory appears in the eighteenth century writings of Bernoulli [7] on rational analysis of risky decisions and of Borda [9] and Condorcet [ 151 on aggregation of individuals' preferences through voting or algebraic combination for collective action.
The first third of the present century witnessed a new level of mathematical sophistication in Norbert Wiener's [103] axiomatic analysis of what we now rcfcr to as interval orders, Frank P. Ramsey's [83] axiomatization for decision under uncertainty, and Bmno de Finetti's [18, 191 contributions to subject probability and logical decision making. As mid-century approached, these were joined by the monumental treatise on rational choice and the theory of games by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [ 1001. Then, in the 195Os, other books that have profoundly influenced mathematical research in decision theory through the rest of the century appeared. These include Kenneth Arrow's [5] work on social choice theory, L.J. Savage's [85] axiomatic foundations for subjective expected utility theory in decision under uncertainty, and Gerard Debreu's [ 171 axiomatization of preferences for utility-based economic equilibrium analysis. The central principle for human judgment and choice in the vast majority of these works and their successors is the notion of order, formalized by transitivity, and the related notion of decision-by-maximization.
Even when decision paradigms do not transparently involve maximization, as with Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games 0304 The emphasis on order and maximization has led to a huge body of work on quantification of preferences, likelihood judgments, and other qualitative aspects of judgment and choice. The obvious reason is that quantification facilitates the search for optimal or near-optimal decisions. A less obvious reason is that many contributors to decision theory have been instrumental in developing the representational theory of measurement, which subsumes but is certainly not limited to representations of preferences and other aspects of decision theory. The representational theory of measurement was formalized in [88] and has received its most complete expression in the three-volume set by Krantz et al. [55] , Suppes et al. [91] and Lute et al. [68] . Its defining characteristic is the quantitative representation by analogous numerical structures of qualitative structures that consist of a ground set X and one or more relations or operations on X. The set X may have a variety of structural properties, e.g. as a Cartesian product set or a set of probability distributions, and one of its relations is often assumed to be a binary ordering relation. A familiar operation is the binary concatenation operation @ where x @ y denotes the joining together of objects X, y E X by placing them end-to-end for length measurement or putting them in the same balance pan for weight measurement. We often use F to denote an asymmetric and transitive binary relation on X, in which case (X, F) is a partially ordered set, and we always define N as its symmetric complement by x N y if neither x + y nor y + x .
The relation + could denote is preferred to, or is more probable than, or is longer than, and so forth. Corresponding interpretations of N are is indifferent to, is equally probable as, and is the same length as. However, if + is assumed only to be a partial order without N also being transitive, in which case N is not necessarily an equivalence relation, then x N y for x # y could signify incomparability rather than comparable equality. Positive, closed extensive measurement provides a nice example of a qualitative structure represented by an analogous quantitative structure. The qualitative structure is (X, +,@) with order relation + on X. We assume also that -is transitive, + is positive [for all x,y E X, x @ y F x], @ is closed under N [for all x,y E X there is a z E X such that z N x $ y], and the structure satisfies an Archimedean condition that is needed for a real valued as opposed to nonstandard or lexicographic representation. The analogous quantitative structure is (R+, >, +), where R+ denotes the positive reals. The representation is: there exists II/ : X --f [w+ such that, for all x, y E X,
x + Y +i ti(x> ' Icl(Y)
and
ti(x @ Y> = $(x) + ti(Y) .
The mapping $ thus preserves F on X by > on R+, and takes @ into +. The next section opens with a few definitions of central importance to our subject and then describes basic representations for ordinal utility theory, additive utility theory, and expected utility theory. Section 3 begins our consideration of specific topics with a discussion of cancellation conditions for finite additive measurement. We emphasize recent work on the extent to which such conditions are needed to ensure additivity. Section 4 continues the additivity theme by showing how a general theorem for additive measurement applies to a utility threshold representation for sets of arbitrary cardinality. Section 5 illustrates recent contributions to decision under risk and decision under uncertainty in two areas. The first is a generalization of Savage's subjective expected utility theory in which utilities are real vectors ordered lexicographically and subjective probabilities take the form of real matrices. The second focuses on the role of a binary operation of joint receipt for situations in which holistic alternatives consist of similar but clearly discernible pieces. Section 6 concludes the paper with examples of preference cycles and representations that accommodate cyclic preferences. The representations described in earlier sections assume that preferences are transitive, or at least acyclic.
Preference representations
This section uses an array of preference structures and their quantitative representations to illustrate our subject and provide points of departure for later sections. We first outline three factors that differentiate among various representations and contain important definitions.
Ftrctor 1: Cardinality of X. The main distinction is among finite, countable (finite or denumerable), and uncountably infinite X. Futor 2: Ordering properties of >. The following four main categories are common.
We say that + on X is: ucycli~ if its transitive closure is it-reflexive (we never have XI + XI + XX, t XI for finite t); u partiul or&r if it is transitive (x + z whenever x + ,V and JJ > z) and irreflexive (we never have x + x); a weak order if it is a partial order for which N is transitive; a linear order if it is a weak order or partial order for which N is the identity relation.
Szpilrajn's [92] theorem implies that an acyclic + has a linear extension, i.e., is included in some linear order. If + is a weak order then N is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, transitive) and the set X/ N of equivalence classes in X determined by N is linearly ordered by +* on X/ N defined by a +* b if x + y for some (hence for all) x E a and y E 6. Factor 3: Representational uniqueness. Suppose the quantitative structure of the representation uses only one real-valued function u on X. Assume that u satisfies the representation, and let U denote the set of all u:X + DB that satisfy it. We then say that u is unique up to:
(ii) a positive gjine transformation if U = {v: there are real numbers a > 0 and b such that U(X) = au(x) + b for all x E X}; (iii) a proportionality transJbrrnation if U = {v: there is an a E [w+ such that v(x) = au(x) for all x E X}.
When a representation uses more than one real-valued function, the same definitions apply to individual functions although additional restrictions on admissible transformations usually obtain when the functions are considered jointly. Other distinguishing factors include special structures for X, the presence or absence of operations like $, and whether a representation involves specialized properties for its real-valued functions such as continuity or linearity. Continuity is often associated with topological structures as described, for example, in [23, 30, 36, 1011 , and it will not play a prominent role in our present discussion, which is primarily algebraic.
The rest of the section outlines traditional topics in preference theory, where u in a representation is usually referred to as a utility function. Theorems that link utility representations to qualitative preference structures by means of assumptions or axioms for preference are noted. Most proofs are available in [23] or in references cited in [30, 36] . I include a few proof comments here to illustrate the representations.
I. Ordinal measurement
A fundamental result for (X, +) says that if X is countable then there is a utility function u : X + IF! such that
for all x, y t X , To obtain (1) when Xi N is uncountable, it needs to be assumed also that X: h, includes a c~ountahlr subset that is >"-order dense in X, N. By definition, A C B is order dense in (B, +o) if, whenever u to h for II. h E B\A, there is a c E A such that a ~0 c ~0 h. Countable order denseness is often replaced in economic discussions by a sufficient but nonnecessary topological assumption which implies that u in ( 1 ) can defined to be continuous in the topology used for X.
Because (1) implies that t is a weak order, it cannot hold when > is acyclic or a partial order that is not also a weak order. We can, however, continue to use 11 to preserve + one-way in the manner x >-_V :+ u(x) > u(J~). We can also use the same u to fully preserve, by equality, the strong indifference relation =Z on X defined by for z on X is an equivalence relation with x + _r z 2 3 x + z and x N J' + z 3 .Y t z.
Thus, if X is countable, there is a u : ,Y + W for which x+v * U(X) > u(y) and s RZ y ++ 24(x) = 24(y) for all 1. ,t' E X,
if and only if > on X is acyclic. Fig. 1 illustrates z on a Haase diagram for a partially ordered set in which one point bears + to a second if there is a downward sequence of lines from the first to the second.
When X/z is uncountable, (2) holds for acyclic + if +*, defined in the natural way on Xl!=:, has a linear extension in which some countable subset is order dense. Further discussion along this line is available in [78, 90] Suppose (X, +) is a partially ordered set that is not necessarily weakly ordered. An alternative to (2) The primary two-way representation for an interval order is
where 
Additive measurement
Several seemingly different types of representations are grouped together under this heading because they have an additive character and can be analyzed by similar mathematical methods. A general theory of additive measurement is presented in [35] , where it is applied to a variety of contexts, including positive extensive measurement, additive utility measurement for multiattribute alternatives, difference measurement for strength of preference comparisons, threshold measurement, expected utility, and comparative probability. The paper includes a condition for X of arbitrary cardinality that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an additive representation. I will describe its approach for threshold measurement in Section 4. The present subsection considers only comparative probability and multiattribute utility to illustrate the additive theme.
I include comparative probability under the preference rubric because its relation > is often defined from preference comparisons. Suppose x and y are uncertain events. Let gx be the gamble that pays $100 if x obtains and $0 otherwise, and similarly for gY. We formulate X for the present discussion as a family of subsets of a universal set Sz. For comparative probability, Q is a set of states, members of X are events, and X usually includes the empty event 8 and universal event 52. The event set X may or may not be closed under operations like union, intersection, and complementation, and its members can have very different cardinalities.
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The set of items to be compared by preference in multiattribute utility theory is a subset A of a Cartesian product set Al x A2 x . . x A, with n 3 2. Each A; is a nonempty set, and we assume without loss of generality that the Ai are mutually disjoint and every ai E 14, appears in at least one n-tuple in A. The universal set Q is defined as U, .A,. for all x, .r t X .
It is common in the multiattribute case to denote the restriction of u on A, by II, so, when x = {LZ~,U~,..., a,l}, C,r@) = C, ~(a,). Th en, when (4) holds, it remains valid when the origin of each Ui is translated by adding a constant c; to all u, values.
For comparative probability, we assume R + 8 and that the union 2 of t and N is monotonic, so x > 1: 3 x 2 y. Then we can take u > 0 and En I) = 1 when (4) holds, so u becomes a probability distribution on s2. A necessary and sufficient condition for (4) referred to as cancellation, independence, or additivity, was identified first by Kraft et al. [54] :
Cancellation.
For every pair x1,x2,. . ,xm and 1.'. y2,. . , ,P of finite sequences of members of X such that ~{.j:~tx~}~=~{j:~E,v~}~ forall c0EQ, it is false that .x' 2 yl for j = 1,. . ,m and xi + ,v' for some j. Necessity of Cancellation for (4) follows from the fact that (5) implies (5) I? c u(w) = 2 c u(w) . j=l ruEa' /=I WEl"
Hence if (4) holds and if Cancellation is violated by xi 2 yl for all j and X/ + y' for some j, summation over j on the right side of (4) followed by cancellation of identical terms leaves the contradiction that 0 > 0. Sufficiency of Cancellation for (4) follows from solution theory for finite systems of linear inequalities by way of a solutionexistence theorem known by various names. including the separating hyperplane lemma, the theorem of the alternative, Farkas's lemma, and Motzkin's lemma: see, for example [23, 37, 55, 87] . Essentially the same separation lemma applies when + is only assumed acyclic or a partial order, with slight modifications in Cancellation. For example, if (4) is to hold when ti is replaced by +, we replace the last line of Cancellation by "it is false that xi + $ for all j." When (4) holds for finite 52 under weak order, u is not generally unique in any simple sense. Special conditions that are not necessary for (4) but which yield simple uniqueness forms, such as absolute uniqueness for subjective probabilities, are described in [30, 36, 45] .
Additional discussions of Cancellation for finite Sz appears in the next section.
Theories of additive measurement for infinite 52 usually assume nicely structured domains, such as A = Al x A2 x . . x A, for additive utility or X = 2* for comparative probability. Most also use existence axioms that simplify cancellation conditions, promote representational uniqueness, and facilitate the derivation or assessment of u.
Examples for (4) is unique and satisfies the following divisibility property: if x + 0 then for every 0 < i, < 1 there is an xi. cx such that u(x),) = ~,u(x). Proof are given in [23, 29] as well as Savage [85] . Survey material on related axiomatizations of comparative probability appears in Section 6 in [36] .
Expected utility
The simplest version of expected utility formulates X as a set of finite-support probability distributions, also called lotteries, on a set C of consequences. The consequences in C are viewed as mutually exclusive outcomes of decision. If x(cI)+x(cz)+x(c~) = 1 for distinct ci E C, and if x is chosen over other lotteries, then the unique outcome of the decision is ci, with probability x(c,), for i = 1,2,3. The expected utility representation for weak order involves a utility function u : C + R for which x * y H axe > C y(c)u(c) for all x,y E X. c c (6) It is commonly assumed that X is closed under convex combinations so /Ix+( 1 -i)y, defined by (3~ + (1 -i_)y)(c) = LX(C) + (1 -J")y(c) for all c E C, is in X whenever x, y E X and 0 G/Z < 1. This is tantamount to assuming that X is closed under every binary operation @i in a set of operations for 2" l [0, 11, with x @;. y = LX + (1 -/z)y.
A straightforward generalization of the simple version under convex closure takes X as a function set closed under a mixture operation which maps each triple (x,j_,y) for x, _Y E X and 0 d i $1 into another member of X that is usually denoted by (x, i, ?') or xi.v or ilu + (1 -1)~. This is essentially the approach taken in the axiomatization of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) whose utility representation is (I ) in conjunction with the lineurity propert?
u(xI._v) = j_u(x) + (1 -I.)u(y) for all x, y E X and all O<i<l .
When the simple version applies and u is extended from X to C by u(c) = u(xI.) under the assumption that every degenerate distribution x,. for which x,,(c) = I, is in X, (6) follows from (I ) and (7). After early confusion about the von NeumannMorgenstem approach was clarified by Malinvaud [72] (see also [46] ), several equivalent axiomatizations for ( 1) and (7) were developed. My favorite is Jensen's [50] which, in addition to properties for the mixture operation, uses three assumptions for F-on X. They are weak order and the following for all x, y, z E X and all 0 < iL < 1:
indrpmdencr: x s y * xA2 t yj2, continuitj7 x * y + z * xx2 k-y >-xfiz for some 2, P t (031) Independence says that F is preserved under similar mixtures. It is usually defended by an interpretation for XLZ and yir, whereby x or y obtains with probability i and 2 obtains with probability I -1.. Continuity ensures the existence of real-valued utilities as opposed to nonstandard or multidimensional lexicographically ordered utilities. We discuss the lexicographic case in Section 5. The proof in [23, 25, 29] that (I ) and (7) follow from weak order, independence and continuity shows that these axioms imply independence for b: x e_ y + .Gz ->xj: for all 0 <j_ < 1 and all z E X. Then, whenever x F ?' and x t z 2 ,v, we prove that z -.riy for a unique i E [O,l] . We then fix x1 + x0, set u(.Y~) = 1 and u(.Q) = 0. define U(Z) = i when XI tz 5x0 and z -X,&Q, and show that (I ) and the linearity property (7) hold for all members of X in the closed preference interval from .Y() and x1. The representation is then extended to the rest of X in the only way that preserves linearity under indifference. The resulting u is unique up to a positive affine transformation obtained, for example. by choosing values for u(x,) and I other than I and 0.
Modifications of (1) with maintenance of linearity (7) when F is assumed only to be a partial order are presented in [23, 25, 75, 98] , and integral forms for (6) are axiomatizated for certain classes of probability measures in [23, 25] .
Beginning around 1980, several investigators developed nonlinear versions of the theory that weaken its independence axiom, which is often inconsistent with actual preferences [3,5 I, 70,961 . Consider an example from Kahneman and Tversky [5 I] with ~($0) = 1 and il = l/4:
x : $3000 with probability 1, y : $4000 with probability 0.8, nothing otherwise, Savage's theory is based on a set C of consequences and a set S of states of the world that describe the decision maker's areas of uncertainty and are outside his or her control. Subsets of S are uncertain events, and the relevant set of events is assumed to be the entire power set 2'. We take X as the function set Cs of all maps from S to C and refer to each x E X as an act. The constant act that assigns consequence c to every state is denoted by C. If x E X is the chosen act and state s obtains, then x(s) is the resulting consequence. Savage's representation is (1) and
S
where u(c) on the right denotes u(C) and 'it is a finitely additive probability measure on 2'. The measure rc is unique and satisfies the divisibility property at the end of the preceding subsection; u is bounded and unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The representation of (1) and (8) is derived from axioms that include weak order, independence assumptions, and an Archimedean partition axiom. The proof shows first that the axioms for comparative probability on 2' at the end of the preceding subsection follow from the axioms of preference. This gives 71, which is then used to construct lotteries that correspond to acts with finite consequence sets {x(s) : s E S}. The natural definition of t-on the lottery set is shown to satisfy expected utility axioms that yield a linear u on lotteries and establish Savage's representation for all acts with finite consequence sets. The representation is then extended to all acts.
Savage's contribution stimulated a number of alternative axiomatizations of subjective expected utility for decision under uncertainty, including theories in [4, 21, 81] . A comprehensive review is given in [24] . Theories that weaken additivity for subjective probability or transitivity of + or N, including those in [41, 47, 69, 86] , are described in Chapter 8 in [29] .
Savage's theory has the disadvantage of requiring S to be infinite. The most popular alternatives to his theory that retain weak order and additive subjective probability, and which yield unique subjective probabilities for finite S, use lotteries in their formulations. This is done either by replacing C by the set PC of all lotteries on C, so that acts map states into lotteries, or by constructing mixed acts as lotteries whose outcomes are Savage acts: see, for example [4, 21, 23] .
To illustrate the PC approach, let X denote the set of all maps from finite S into PC. State s is said to be nonnull if x > y for some x,y E X that differ only in state s. We apply Jensen's axioms of weak order, independence and continuity to (X, > ) and add a nontriviality condition the new independence axiom says that +,r is the same for every nonnull state. Since us preserves +$, it follows for nonnull s and t that us is a positive affine transformation of u,, say us = au, + b with a > 0, so a = n(s)/n(t) for (9) . That is, U, = rr(s)u and ut = n(t)u, and normalization of the X(S) then gives (9) with C rc(s) = 1.
Cancellation conditions
By the late 1960s weak-order additive representations for infinite X with nice uniqueness properties were well understood [23, 55] , but two noticeable gaps existed for finite-X representations.
The first concerned conditions that imply nice uniqueness structures comparable to those of some infinite-X representations. This was partly rectified by the late 1980s in a series of papers surveyed in [45] .
The second gap concerned Cancellation. To focus this concern, we reformulate Cancellation from Section 2.2 as a sequence of conditions based on the number J of distinct pairs (xj, 9) involved in (5). The condition for J is denoted by C(J). it is false thatxiky forj= l,..., J andxJ+# for somej.
Condition C( 1) is vacuous since its hypotheses require x' = y', and C(2) is tantamount to the first-order independence condition which says that if (x1, y') # (x2,y2) and if every cc) E Q appears in (x1,x2) the same number of times it appears in (y', y*), then x' S-y1 H y2 S-x2. An example for A = { 1,2,3} x {a,b,c} that satisfies C(2) is the linear order 3c + 36 + 2c + Ic t 3a + 26 + 2a % lb h-la.
but this violates C(3) because
In this example, al = ~(2 = a3 = 1 and 3c = {3,c},3b = (3, b}, and so forth.
The hi in C(J) are used for repetitions of the same (x,y) pair in the sequence (x1, v'), . . ., (x", y") of Cancellation, which is clearly equivalent to the conjunction of C(2), C(3), . . . Our concern for Cancellation is the smallest J such that every weakordered set A C Al x A2 x . . x A, of a given size has an additive representation if it satisfies C(2) through C(J). We revert here to the product formulation of multiattribute preference, which applies also to comparative probability when IAiJ = 2 for all i and an event is characterized by the vector (al,. . . , a,) which has a, = 1 if state i is in the event and ai = 0 otherwise.
We define the size of X, or of A &AI x A2 x . . . x A,, as the n-tuple (yi, ~2,. . . , vn) for which yli = IAi 1 for each i. To avoid trivial Ai, we assume along with n 2 2 that yi 22 for all i. We then define f(ri, ~2,. . . qn) as the smallest positive integer J* such that every weak order on X of size (yi, 172,. . . , qn) that violates Cancellation does so for some C(J) with J < J*. In other words, if f(yi, ~9,. . . , qn) = J*, then:
(i) there is a weak order + on X of size (~1, ~2,. . . ,qn) that violates C(J*) but satisfies C(J) for all J E (2,. . , J* -1);
(ii) every weak order on an X of size (qi,ylz,. . . ,y,) that satisfies C(J) for J = 2 , . . . , J* also satisfies C(K) for all K > J* for which C(K) is defined for that size and therefore has an additive representation as in (4).
In the comparative probability setting for weak orders, Kraft et al. [54] , proved that X has an additive representation if n<4 and first-order independence holds, so f(2,2) = f(2,2,2) = f(2,2,2,2) = 2. They showed also that f(2,2,. . . ,2)24 for all n 2 5. In the multiattribute setting, Krantz et al. 155, pp. 4274281 noted that f(2, ~2) = 2 for all y/z 22. Little else was known about f until recently.
We summarize here results in [37-391 and note topics for further research. The first two papers focus on yli = 2 for all i. Let 2, denote (2.2,.
,2) with IE entries. The first paper shows that ,f'(2,) = 4 and ,J'(2,, ) 3 n ~ I for n = 6,7,8. The latter result is extended to all n 26 in [38] by explicit constructions based on a theorem in the first paper that is designed to identify structures that violate C(J) for relatively large J but satisfy all C(J') for small J'. Fishburn [37] also shows that for every n 25 there are weak order cases of comparative probability that violate C(4) but have additive representations whenever one state is deleted, and that there are failures of Cancellation that require X, # yj for some i and ,j in any corresponding failure of a C(J ). In other words, (4) can have no solution when every applicable C(J) holds under the restriction that X(I = ~2 = ... = xJ = 1.
Fishbum [39] considers vi 23 as well as 11~ = 2 and proves the following upper bound on ,f':
This is ineffective for the case of ,f(2.112) = 2, but shows in conjunction with the lower bound of the preceding paragraph that n -1 < f( 2,1) <II + 1 for all n 3 6. We also prove for n = 2 that ~<f (3,~2) for all even ~1~4. and 112 -1 <f(3,t/l) for all odd ~2 2.5. The upper bound for these cases is f(3,tp)<q2 + 2. Two areas for further research are my conjecture that ,f'(2n) = II ~~ 1 for all n 26, and derivation of good lower bounds on ,f'(~lr, ~2,. ,q,) for general sizes. It seems plausible that ,f'(r~, ,112,. . , ~1,~) is very close to the upper bound C q, ~ (n -1 ) for most sizes, but this awaits further study.
Thresholds
This section describes a general theorem for additive measurement in [35] [52, 53] .
To apply the theorem to the opening representation of this section, let X' be a disjoint copy of X with x' E X' corresponding to x E X, and opening representation can then be rewritten as 
Decision under risk and uncertainty
An enormous amount of theoretical and empirical research effort has been devoted to decision under risk and decision under uncertainty during the past few decades. 1 comment here on two topics that illustrate very different facets of this work. Both have assumed that + on X is a weak order. The first is a theory of subjective expected utility that relaxes continuity or an Archimedean axiom to obtain vector-valued utilities ordered lexicographically along with subjective probabilities characterized by real matrices rather than real numbers. The second departs more radically from traditional theories and considers the role of a binary operation 9 of joint receipt. The principal investigators are Irving LaValIe in the lexicographic domain and Duncan Lute for joint receipt.
The lexicographic story beings with Hausner's [49] lexicographic linear utility theory for a weak order + on a mixture space X that can be viewed as a set of lotteries or its generalization for (7) that is closed under a mixture operation. Hausner assumed that > and -satisfy independence (x + y 3 _y& t JJ/.Z; x -y =+ ~5.z -_rj.z ) and proved that (X, +) is represented by a linear mapping into a real vector space ordered lexicographically. When the vector space has finite dimension, say R"', this gives 11: A' -R"' that satisfies (7) (7) and (1 I ) are analyzed in detail in [25] .
The typical failure occurs when x + y + z and y # xi.,-for all L E [0, I], in which case there is a unique i* E [0, 11 such that xw > ~3 t .x/~z for all rx > /.* > /i . and either xi*= t y or y > xi*z An example based on marginal probabilities is x = (_rr ,x2) in which x1 is the probability of dying and x2 is the probability that you or your heirs will receive $10. If no increase in XI can be compensated for by increasing x_ 1 to I, then t cannot be represented by a linear unidimensional utility function, but u(xl,xz) = (-x1,x2) can represent + lexicographically.
The extension of linear lexicographic utility to decision under uncertainty in [42,57- 591 formulates X as the set of all finite-support probability distributions, called mixed acts, on a set A of acts in Cs with S = { 1,2,. . . , n}. In the main state-independent version of our theory, we assume that every consequence is relevant for every state in S, that the constant-act set {F: c E C} is included in A, and that A has some additional structure. We denote by XC the set of all lotteries on C and let xi E Xc denote the marginal distribution in state i of x E X.
The preference relation + applies to X, and for p and q in XC, p + q means that x + y when x(F) = p(c) and y(C) = q(c) for every consequence c E C. We assume the following axioms: + is a weak order, + and N satisfy independence,
x -y whenever x, = yi for i = 1,2,. . , n , and a relaxed form of Archimedean axiom which implies that the lexicographic hierarchy has only finitely many levels. The axioms imply the existence of linear G :X + L@ and u : XC + RK that preserve lexicographically k on X and + on XC, respectively, with parsimonious dimension J of u^ and K of u. Because + on XC is tantamount to the restriction of + on X to mixed constant acts, we have K < J, and K < J if preferences between other acts force levels into the hierarchy not accounted for by u on XC. Uniqueness follows the format described after (11). The resulting representation is
Subjective matrix probabilities L'(i)
for all x, y E X .
(l-2) i=l
i=l LaValle and Fishburn [60, 61] show how to assess the vector utilities and matrix probabilities in (12) . The latter paper also describes admissible transformations of the matrix-probability distribution n for any given u that put 17 in a standard normalized To consider these questions, let A0 denote a nonempty set of basic objects. such as amounts of money or lotteries, and let i? denote a binary operation of joint receipt that applies first to A() and then to Ai, AZ,. WeassumethatAoUA,CXiAo~ '4,. Then X includes at least one joint-receipt level. We assume also that + on X is a weak order.
An elementary case of joint receipt that does not involve decision under risk or uncertainty takes X = A0 U Al with As = [w. We interpret x E A0 as an amount of money and refer to x30 as a gain and to x 60 as a loss. An early empirical and partly theoretical study of joint receipt for this case is Thaler [93] , followed by Thaler and Johnson [94] and Linville and Fischer [62] . They focused in part on the herk~ic~ erlitin~q ruk 14(x r:, y ) = max{ u(x + y), u(x) + u(y)} for all x, J' E A0 ,
where IA : X + R is strictly increasing, preserves +, and has its origin fixed by u ( Research that followed Thaler [93] in [62, 94] and ~ within a setting of certainty equivalents for monetary lotteries ~ [13, 65] , shows that (13) is not viable in many situations. Part of the difficulty arises in the mixed region, where individuals' assessments of joint receipts are not generally well understood. Another difficulty can be seen in the conjecture of Tversky and Kahneman [97] that x CI+ _r 1 -x + _v, which was sustained at least in the loss and gain regions separately in [13] . If x @ y -x + y everywhere, it would gut (13) by effectively excluding u(x @ y) = u(x) + u(y). Also, as Tversky and Kahneman [97] notes, if in fact we assume that u(x @ y) = u(x) + u(y), as was done in part of Lute and Fishburn [66] , and if x @ y N x + y, then u(x) = kx for some k > 0, and this linear form is supported neither by intuition nor by empirical research.
Empirical and theoretical investigations of joint receipt of lotteries or acts in decision under risk or uncertainty include, in addition to the certainty-equivalence approach of [66] is based on a qualitative structure (X, +, @,e) where + is a weak order on X, @ is a joint receipt operation on X, and e denotes the status quo consequence. Several axioms for the qualitative structure imply that there exists u :X t R that satisfies ( 1) (14) for the mixed cases of x 2 e 2 y and y 2 e 2 x were adopted as a compromise between u(x $ y) = u(x) + u(y) and more complex possibilities.
To expand the formulation to the context of decision under uncertainty, we can take A0 as the set of all acts in Cs that assign only finite numbers of consequences to the states, define Al, AZ,. . . as above, and assume that @ is associative so that A, can be replaced by the set A* of all finite sequences al @ a2 $ . . @ a, for which m 22 and a, t A0 for all i. Representation (14) applies under this expansion with X = A0 U A*. Given X in this form, Lute and Fishburn [66] describes conditions which imply algebraic forms for the utility of acts that involve subjective probabilities.
We illustrate with C = Iw, as in a monetary context, with u(C) increasing in c.
Let cEd denote the act in A,J that yields c if event E C S obtains and yields d otherwise. Assuming that E is neither empty nor the universal event and that e = 0 with 0 <rC(E) 6 1 for * E {+, -} and E C S, and with the rr* unique and II unique up to a proportionality transform that fixes u(e) at 0. Additional conditions that allow further refinements for u(x+) and U(.C ) based on (14) are described in the reference.
Lute and Fishburn [67] focuses on the monetary context with e = 0 and considers first the effect of x @ y -x $ y for monetary amounts with 3 monotonic. We adopt the first and last lines of (14) for joint gains and joint losses respectively, so that for gains,
We assume kt > 0 and kp < 0, which imply u(x + y) < u(x) + u(y) for gains and u(x + J)) > U(X) + u(y) for losses, given x t;, y -?I + y. These inequalities are consistent with studies, including Kahneman and Tversky [51] and others surveyed in [40] , that observe increasing marginal utility for losses and decreasing marginal utility for gains. We show in [67] that these hypotheses imply exponential expressions for utility of gains and utility of losses:
1/(X) = { k'(1 -eC") , E > 0 for gains (x30), kK(l ~ ebr) , /I > 0 for losses (x<O)
We also consider lotteries without presuming x t; y -x + y but maintaining the parts of (14) 
U(X) = C U((.i)[U+(Pj) -a+(P;&[ )] , I
in which Pi = p1 +p2+.. fpi and o+ is a continuous and increasing map from [0, l] onto [0, 11. A similar form with G-in place of g+ applies to lotteries on losses. The issue of mixed gains and losses is more problematic as described in Section 5 in [67] .
Nontransitive preferences
A preference relation F on a set X is nontrunsitive if there are x, y,z E X for which x~y,yrzandnot(x~z),andiscycliciftherearexl,x2,...,x,~Xwithm33such that x, >-xi+1 for all i < m and x, F xi. The representations described thus far assume that t is transitive, or at least acyclic. I believe that this reflects a strong attraction of decision theorists and perhaps others to transitivity as an intuitively obvious basis for rational thought and action, an apparently natural desire for order in practical affairs, and the supposed efficiency of optimization based on maximization.
Although I find some merit in these contentions, I argue elsewhere [32] against transitivity as an undeniable tenet of rational preferences because I believe that reasonable people sometimes hold nontransitive or cyclic preference patterns that account for their true feelings. My purpose here is not to recount the arguments for or against transitivity set forth in [32] . Instead, I will illustrate a few situations that might give rise to cyclic patterns and then describe four representations that can account for cyclic preferences by straightforward and elegant generalizations of representations that presume transitivity.
The genesis of cyclic patterns in decision theory may be Condorcet's [ 151 phenomenon of cyclic majority. The simplest example uses candidates x, y and z and three voters with preference orders x +i y +r z, z +2 x >2 y and y %3 z +3 x. Then, with F the strict simple majority relation, x t y > z F x. Arrow's [S] famous extension shows that every reasonable rule for aggregating voters' preference orders that makes binary social comparisons without regard to other candidates' positions in voters' orders, and which allows a variety of voter preference profiles, must have profiles for which the social comparison relation is nontransitive.
Subsequent contributions on this theme are reviewed in [28] .
Multiattribute comparisons provide a source of cyclic preferences for an individual.
May [73] asked 62 college students to make binary comparisons between hypothetical marriage partners x, y and z characterized by three attributes, intelligence, looks and wealth:
x : very intelligence, plain, well off, y : intelligent, very good looking, poor, z : fairly intelligent, good looking, rich.
Seventeen of the 62 had the 2-to-1 majority cyclic pattern x + y + z + x; the other 45 had transitive preferences. Let (a, p) denote the lottery that pays $a with probability p and nothing otherwise. Tversky [95] observed that a significant number of people have the cyclic pattern Subjective expected utility theory says that xl N x2 N x3 N x4 N XI because every act is equivalent to a lottery with equal chances for the four prizes. However, some people will have xt t x2 F x3 > x4 F xt because the first act in each t comparison yields a larger prize than the second in three of the four states. Others may have the opposite cycle if they fear that they will experience severe regret if they choose the act with a $7000 prize in state i over the one with the $10000 prize in the same state and i turns out to be the state that obtains.
We now describe four representations that accommodate cyclic preferences. The first two apply to multiattribute situations, the third to lottery comparisons in decision under risk, and the fourth to act comparisons in decision under uncertainty. Letx = (x1,x2,..., x,) and y = (yl, ~2,. . , y,,) denote items described by IZ attributes. Assume that the attribute levels within a given attribute are unambiguously ordered by a weak order > ,. The udditive d@ermcc represent&on is The latter axiomatizations imply that each cbi is &en, symmrtric, i.e.. and all three imply that the di are unique up to proportionality transformations with a common scale multiplier.
Skew symmetry is also used in our other two representations. The representation for lotteries x and y on a set C of consequences is x + y @ &(x,y) > 0, where 4 is a real-valued, skew-symmetric and bilinear function on ordered pairs of lotteries.
Bilinearity means that 4(xI.z, y) = Q(x, y) + ( 1 -;,)4(z. y) and 4(x, y2z) = 2$(x, y) + (1 -i)&x,z). We refer to the representation as the SSB representation, short for skew-symmetric and bilinear. When all individual consequences are in X and it is convex, we have the bilinear expected utility expression
The SSB representation was first described in [56] and is axiomatized in [29] , with 4 unique up to a proportionality transformation.
A constant-threshold SSB representation that has x + y H I$(x,~) > 1 is axiomatized in [44] .
Our final representation applies + to a Savage act set X = Cs for decision under uncertainty. The representation is 
where # is a skew-symmetric functional on C x C and rt is a finitely additive probability measure on 2s, with rc unique and 4 unique up to a proportionality transformation.
When 4 decomposes as &c,d) = u(c) -u(d), (17) reduces to Savage's subjective expected utility representation. Axioms that imply (17) for all acts that use only finite numbers of consequences are in Chapter 9 in [29] . They are like Savage's axioms in most respects with weak order replaced by an asymmetry condition. Extension to all acts is also discussed in Chapter 9. Other representations that are closely related to (17) appear in [29, 41, 63] . Although cyclic preference patterns have been studied in depth for aggregate relations in voting and social choice theory, they have received very little attention in individual decision theory. Unlike most decision theorists, I think the aversion to cyclic preferences for individuals is unjustified, and I hope that more will be done on the subject in the years ahead.
